Essay on difference between jihad and terrorism - what is a thesis statement in a rhetorical analysis









essay on difference between jihad and terrorism

essay on difference between jihad and terrorismEssay on difference between jihad and terrorism -Western thinking admires empirics, metrics, and pie charts.Radicalisation is committed to allowing a full range of diverging opinions to be heard.These are flash points which some people will see as directly necessitating some form of a response.Although many left-wing radicals sincerely believed in universal change with respect to the individual and his role in society, their actual policies were oriented more toward local rather than global interests.Of course, with large percentages of the world’s population in poverty and indeed many sections of wealthier societies experiencing varying levels of discrimination on grounds such as ethnicity or religion, these motivational factors alone are not enough to explain how an individual could be radicalised.Ed Husain, co-founder of a UK think tank set-up to educate about and counter such groups writes about his experiences in what he sees as feeder groups for violent extremism operating in the UK.In 1975, for example, the Ejército Revolutionario del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Army) kidnapped wealthy Argentine heirs for a $60 million ransom.Whilst Crenshaw mentions psychological factors in her original article, it is important to note that in most cases there are no obvious indicators of abnormal psychological factors.Too many analysts underestimate the ideological basis of terrorism and argue instead that rational-strategic rather than ideological principles motivate Islamist terror groups.These specific discussions aside, the idea of particular triggers to action are perhaps the most discussed (and easiest to comprehend) of the potential causes of radicalisation.In contrast, the short term and long term aims of al Qaeda were decidedly violent.For example, whilst the actions of the UK July 7 bombers were seen as proof of individuals who were not properly absorbed into UK society, their lives up to that point suggested otherwise and this is often, though not always, the case.Since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution, there has been a steady rise in Islamist terrorism.In these last areas we can see how such developments can make it easier for radicalisation to occur.Controlling time is a unifying characteristic of secular agenda terror.In the short term, actions such as 9/11 sought to motivate sympathisers whilst also striking terror into their ‘enemy’.Whilst ‘modernity’ in these discussions covers a broader range of developments, in this case I am referring more specifically to developments like mass transit, urbanisation and electronic technology.Groups immersed in the rhetoric of liberation, for example, target governing officials and foreign residents.Strategic aims – long term and short term Whilst individuals may believe that there is a requirement upon them to act in response to a particular event, it is of course far from the case that this normally leads to violent action.Whilst there are lots of radicalisation models (Ehud Sprinzak, Clark Mc Cauley and Sophia Moskalenko and Fathali Moghaddam are examples of typical discussions) they all tend to draw on similar causes.essay on difference between jihad and terrorismCommon examples of such triggers include UK Government policy, such as the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which were cited by Mohammed Sidique Khan as a reason for his role in the 7 July bombings in London.If you would like to submit a piece for the Discussions and Debates section, then please submit your suggestion via the Contact-Us page.In Algeria, for example, the FLN reestablished close ties with France upon winning Algerian independence.Baader Meinhof did similarly with Hanns-Martin Schleyer, a West German businessman.Situational factors, pre-conditions Living in large cities may bring people closer together and make it easier to share radical ideas, but people are less likely to be radicalised without any motivation to do so.Although Plato, Aristotle, and leading Christian theologians such as Thomas of Aquinas, John of Salisbury, and George Buchanan discuss political violence, most terrorism experts mark Maximilian Robespierre's "Reign of Terror" during the French Revolution as the beginning of modern, political, systematic terrorism.[18] Beginning in the early nineteenth century, German and Italian radicals embraced terrorism and, in the 1880s, Narodnaya Volya (People's will), which conducted a violent campaign of assassination to fight autocracy in Russia,[19] became a role model for similar groups established by Armenians, Macedonians, Bosnians, and Serbs prior to World War I.[20] Between 19, there was a visible decline in terrorism perpetrated by independent political groups although Fascist governments and the Soviet Union sometimes sponsored terror against their own populations for internal political objectives. Between 19, there were three principle types of terrorist entities: organizations struggling for independence from colonial occupiers such as the Front de Libération nationale (FLN) in Algeria or the Mau Mau in Kenya; separatist groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and the Basque Euzkadi Ta-Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain; and socioeconomic revolutionaries such as the Montoneros in Argentina, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Baader Meinhof Gang in West Germany, and the Red Brigades in Italy.[21] A commonality among all groups, though, would be an attempt to justify their actions in economic or social theory.This essay will not seek to critique the plausibility of such a model being uncovered (although it is worth noting that none of the major theorists on radicalisation suggest that there is a universal model with predictive certainty) but will instead focus on what are commonly understood to be the various causes of radicalisation.Warnings prior to attacks that might harm the general population show that these groups sought more to make a political statement and less to cause a blood bath.The Italian Red Brigades seized and, on March 16, 1978, executed Aldo Moro, a former Italian prime minister.While a few secular agenda terrorists starved themselves to death in prison in Germany or Ireland,[35] their suicides were not part of operations but came only after capture.These motivational factors make it more likely that someone may want to utilise the favourable conditions presented by modern technology to subscribe to radicalised ideas.In 1963, the year after Algeria won its independence, Paris provided it with 1.3 billion francs (US$260 million) in loans.[26] In no instance did the enemy associate with a particular civilization or culture, as now occurs with pan-Islamist terrorism.Shane Brighton and Mark Sedgwick both critique the role anger at foreign policy is seen to play in debates about radicalisation, providing nuanced arguments about the differences between legitimate disagreement and whether it is a reliable indicator of potential violent extremism.Where former members have acted violently, they argue, it has only been after disagreement and expulsion from the group that they have done so, and it is the exception, not the rule.The Holy Grail of radicalisation theories would look like a model that would be a one-size-fits-all approach to explaining how a normal person could carry out violent actions against his or hers fellow citizens.While it was popular to talk about the internationalization of terrorism in the 1970s, incentives for terrorist groups to cooperate had more to do with tactical concerns than with ideological motivation.Moro's Red Brigade kidnappers and the Black September terrorists, who on March 1, 1973, seized the U. embassy in Khartoum, also demanded prisoner releases.[34] Suicide bombing was never and still is not as frequent a tactic for secular agenda terrorists as it is for Islamist groups.Individual factors Crenshaw gives greater attention to individual factors than I have here.Rather, he suggests, that suicide bombers, wherever they are in the world, are motivated much more by tactical goals.Important differences exist between those terrorist groups striving to implement secular revolutionary principles based on the thinking of Vladimir Lenin, Mao Zedong, or Ernesto "Che" Guevara[5] and the groups motivated by the religious revolutionary theories of Muslim Brotherhood theoretician Sayyid Qutb, Iranian ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, or Palestinian theologian Abdullah Yusuf 'Azzam, whose concept of defense of Muslim lands as every Muslim's personal obligation had major influence on Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden.[6] The writings of leading terrorist theoreticians offer insight into their political objectives. essay on difference between jihad and terrorism Assumptions that there is something unique about religion (and particular religions) that causes violence are misleading and my own research (Francis and Knott, 2011) has demonstrated how linkages can be found between secular and religious ideological responses to conflict and difference.These considerations are equally applicable to secular as they are to religious ideologies.The background factors are as individual as those who choose this step and this in a large part explains the difficulty of theories of radicalisation to accurately predict violent behaviour. Just as it seems fortunate at times that some well-advanced plots have failed at the moment of execution, so it could also be the case that chance decisions or events led to those individuals being in that place at that time.Radical, but arguably non-violent groups such as Hizb are seen as providing a gateway for disaffected people (in this case, young Muslims) to develop and express increasingly radical views.These categories can be broken down further and in order to give a clear overview of these I have listed them in the following table with examples, on which I will expand below.This is not to equate radicalisation to terrorism (although certainly a lot of the contemporary discourse about radicalisation assumes violent outcomes), but is rather because this model provides an accessible and comprehensive means to grouping and discussing the potential causes of radicalisation.The ideological basis of such an interpretation has deep roots in Islamic theology, but it came to prominence with the twentieth-century rise of Muslim Brotherhood theorists such as Banna and Qutb and was further developed by their successors."[17] There is nothing new about terrorism inspired by secular agendas. Lawrence's assistance to the Arab revolt in the Hijaz laid the foundation for modern guerrilla warfare, a subject later developed by Chinese revolutionary Mao Zedong.Rather than filter evidence to fit the model, responsible political scientists should adjust their models to accommodate the evidence.This has been a common caveat expressed throughout this consideration of the factors causing radicalisation and it continues to be the case in our consideration of individual factors.Further, in almost every case, if a terrorist group seized a government or defeated a colonial power, it, nevertheless, found it in its interest to restore diplomatic and economic relations quickly.For example, while the role of radical groups provokes much debate, with some commentators seeing groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, for example, as part of a ‘conveyor belt’ to radicalisation, there is a clear difference between the ideological response of Hizb to the preceding factors to that of al Qaeda’s.Whilst the above examples were important causes of radicalisation in their own contexts, it is likely that the American and Tunisian revolutions would have occurred without them.The secular emphasis of Pape's theories also comforts. Islamism is an ideology, and that it does not fit neatly into existing political theory should be beside the point.[4] Inattention to the ideological upbringing of terrorists is counterproductive.Among canonical works secular revolutionaries may embrace are Mao[7] and Guevara's[8] books on guerilla warfare; General Võ Nguyên Giap's Peoples Army—Peoples War,[9] Carlos Marighela's Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare,[10] or Abraham Guillén's Teoría de la Violencia (The theory of violence).[11] Islamists have supplanted these with a new canon including Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna's essays,[12] the writings of the Muslim Brotherhood's main theoretician Sayyid Qutb,[13] essays on Islamic governance by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,[14] Abdullah Yusuf 'Azzam's Join the Caravan,[15] and bin Laden deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri's Knights under the Prophet's Banner.[16] After analyzing the religious foundations of suicide bombing, David Bukay, a lecturer in political science at the University of Haifa, explains, "Suicide bombing in the Muslim world cannot be separated from religion …There are many theories of radicalisation as well as those scholars who argue that radicalisation in itself is a flawed concept.Although the empirical tools of political science are ill-equipped to assess culture, ideology, and motivation, difficulty in quantifying these factors does not mean they do not exist.Whether secular or religious, most terrorist and guerrilla organizations hold sacred a few influential works.However, this should not distract from attention given to the causes of radicalisation discussed above.Examples are easier to think of than the other situational factors, such as laws like the 1773 Tea Act (that led to the Boston Tea Party) or the self-immolation of the Tunisian trader Mohamed Bouazizi (that led to the 2011 Tunisian Revolution).Pape avoids this conclusion by gerrymandering his data so that he does not need to include the significant numbers of suicide bombings conducted by Sunnis against Shi'a in Iraq.[3] Middle East expert Martin Kramer suggests that Pape's theses may be comforting to Western readers who want to believe that if only the United States were to pull its military forces from the Persian Gulf and if only all occupation in the Middle East would end, that there would be no more suicide bombings. essay on difference between jihad and terrorism For example, in 2003 over a million people are reported to have marched against UK involvement in the Iraq war, an entirely peaceful response to a situational precipitant factor.Social and economic revolutionaries targeted businessmen and bankers.Factors like poverty, for example, are also often cited as causes of potential radicalisation.In the longer term, they sought the removal of US military forces from Saudi Arabia, amongst other aims (these aims can be found in statements translated in works by, for example, Raymond Ibrahim and Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (2008)).For example, the internet provides a powerful and accessible means for radical ideas to be shared and reinforced amongst large audiences.The Demos report ‘The edge of violence’ makes such a distinction and I refer the reader to this important discussion within this valuable report.Hostage taking and voicing demands against a deadline leads many governments to negotiate and some, such as the West German government, to capitulate, as Bonn did when it freed three Black September terrorists who remained alive after the September 1972 Munich massacre of Israeli Olympians.[31] Hostage-taking also amplifies media coverage into what Gabi Weiman, a Haifa University professor of communication, calls "the theater of terror."[32] British prime minister Margaret Thatcher recognized the same phenomenon when she declared after a terror attack in 1985, "We must find ways to starve the terrorists and hijacker of the oxygen and publicity on which they depend."[33] The most common secular agenda terrorist demand, at least historically, is for the release of prisoners.As highlighted above, there are different kinds of models which predict how people may display characteristics of radicalisation within these categories as well as strong debate over the validity both of the definition and of theories of radicalisation.In this essay I am going to group these along the lines of a model applied to causes of terrorism by Martha Crenshaw.Comparison between terrorist groups with secular and religious agendas, however, suggests that ideology matters for both and that downplaying religious inspiration for terrorism in an effort to emphasize tactical motivations is both inaccurate and dangerous.In most if not all cases, the definition of the opponent by secular agenda guerrillas and terrorist groups was confined to a socioeconomic concept such as "Yankee" capitalism or resisting the imperialism of countries such as Great Britain or France.[22] Even the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) infused its national liberation agenda with Marxist rhetoric.[23] Among anti-colonial movements, a terrorist group's victory did not seek to shatter the nation-state system or eradicate the defeated side.In doing so, it is useful to make some distinctions between radicals (those people holding radical ideas) and violent radicals (those holding radical ideas that countenance violence).Further reading: Shane Brighton, ‘British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy‘ Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Causes of Terrorism‘ Ehud Sprinzak ‘The Process of Delegitimation‘ Articles are submitted to a review process involving the Advisory Board, to ensure that offensive or unsuitable material is withheld.Economic background, relative assimilation into ‘host’ cultures, apparent ideological background and other seemingly important factors all fail to account for why some people act violently and others do not.Guevara's attempt to export the Cuban revolution to Congo and Bolivia floundered,[24] and all attempts by Latin American guerillas to unite failed.Some researchers suggest that to understand terrorism it is more important to study what terrorists do rather than what they say.[1] University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape argues, for example, that Islam has little to do with suicide bombing.However, poverty need not be a factor, he also argues that the experiences of discrimination and social segregation encountered by middle-class, educated persons can also be a significant cause of radicalisation.Therefore, he suggests focus upon religion is a distraction and that policymakers seeking to stop the scourge of suicide attacks should work instead to address root causes, which he sees as the presence of troops or interests in disputed or occupied lands.[2] Despite the revisionism advanced by Pape and others, the fact remains that most suicide bombings since 1980 in the world in general and in the Middle East in particular are sponsored by Islamist and not secular terrorist groups.For example, while the current and previous UK government warns universities that lonely Muslim students are potentially at risk of radicalisation, there is much less chance of any young person becoming radicalised if they have not viewed their life through a prism of discrimination or deprivation, have not seen particular events, such as the Iraq war, as requiring a direct and personal response and have not joined groups with violent ideologies and aims.That this action was peaceful represented the strategic aims of the anti-war movement, which sought in the short-term to make a clear statement of dissatisfaction against UK policy, whilst in the longer term to halt any UK involvement in a war against Iraq. essay on difference between jihad and terrorism These are flash points which some people will see as directly necessitating some form of a response. essay on difference between jihad and terrorism

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